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DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS
Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974)
The Younger v. Harris cases' left unclear
whether the path opened by Dombrowski v.
Pfister2 for obtaining equitable relief in federal
court was narrowed by limiting the circumstances in which a district court could grant

such relief when state statutes were challenged
as allegedly restricting the exercise of constitutionally protected activity.3 The Supreme
Court in Steffel v. Thompson 4 not only clarified Younger but permitted declaratory relief
to plaintiffs threatened with a good faith state
prosecution.
The propriety of federal court intervention
into state judicial administration has been
argued extensively since the landmark case of
Ex parte Young 5 upheld the right of a federal
court to enjoin state officials from enforcing an
unconstitutional state law." In order for a petiI Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971); Boyle v.
Landry, 401 U.S. 77 (1971); Perez v. Ledesma,
401 U.S. 82 (1971).
2 Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
3 See generally Sedler, Dombrowski In the
Wake of Younger: The View Front Without and
Within, 1972 Wis. L. REv 1 (1972) ; Note, ImpUcations of the Younger Cases For the Availability
of Federal Equitable Relief When No State Prosecution Is Pending, 72 COLuM. L. REv. 876
(1972) ; Case Note, Federal Court Intervention in
State Criminal Proceedings, 85 HARv. L. Rav. 301
(1971).
4 Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974).
5 Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 147 (1908).
6 The Court in Ex parte Young held that
individuals who as officers of the state, are
clothed with some duty in regard to enforcement of the laws of the State, and who
threaten and are about to commence proceedings, either of a civil or criminal nature, to
enforce against parties affected, an unconstitutional act, violating the Federal Constitution,
may be enjoined by a Federal Court of equity
from such action.
209 U.S. at 156.
This area of federal intervention was initiated
through the civil rights legislation of the late
1800s and is exemplified today by 42 U.S.C. §
1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1948), giving the
federal courts the power to consider action taken
by individuals under color of law, custom, or
usage. 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) reads:

tioner to convince the district court7 not to abstain, he must meet the traditional equitable
requirements8 for injunctive relief or show that
there is
a substantial controversy between parties having adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a
declaratory judgment.9
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by law
to be commenced by any person:
(3) To redress the deprivation: Under
color of any State law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution
of the United States or by any Act of Congress providing for equal rights of citizens or
of all persons within the jurisdiction of the
United States.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1971) reads:
Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any
State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be
subjected any citizen of the United States or
other persons within the jurisdiction thereof to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in
any action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress.
For a more complete history of the expansion of
federal judicial power to protect the constitutional
rights of citizens see Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S.
241, 245-249 (1969).
7 In cases which injunctive relief is requested 28
U.S.C. § 2281 is applicable. The statute reads:
An interlocutory or permanent injunction restraining the enforcement, operation or execution of any State statute by restraining the action of any officer of such State in the
enforcement or execution of such statutes,
shall not be granted by any district court
judge thereof upon the ground of the unconstitutionality of such statute unless the application therefor is heard and determined by a
district court of three judges under section
2284 of this title.
8 The two important traditional requirements for
granting of injunctive relief are exhaustion of
state remedies and demonstration of irreparable injury. See Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479
(1965) ; Douglas v. City of Jeanette, 319 U.S. 157
(1943) ; Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 147 (1908).
9 Maryland Casualty Co. v, Pacific Coal Co.,
312 U.S. 270, 293 (1941). This is the generally
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plus demonstrate that the policy against federal
court interference with state enforcement of
their laws is inapplicable. 10 The extent to which
this policy of comity and federalism compels
the federal district courts to abstain from hearing challenges to the constitutionality of state
accepted test for the issuance of a declaratory
judgment. Justice Brennan stated in his separate
opinion in Perez v. Ledesma:
Ordinarily a declaratory judgment will be appropriate if the case or controversy requirements of Article III are met, if the narrow
special factors warranting federal abstention
are absent, and if the declaration will serve a
useful purpose in resolving the dispute.
401 U.S. 82, 121 (1971).
10 This policy of non-intervention was first expressed in a 1793 Act which stated that no injunction could be granted to stay proceedings in any
state court. 1 Stat. 335, c. 22, § 5. Ex parte Young
affirmed in its language the policy of this Act. 209
U.S. at 162. Today the anti-injunction statute,
found at 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1948), is essentially like
the 1793 Act with the allowance for some exceptions. The statute reads:
A court of the United States may not grant
an injunction to stay proceedings in a state
court except as expressly authorized by Act of
Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments.
This abstention policy, sometimes referred to as
comity or federalism, is by no means only statutory. The anti-injunction statute is silent as to declatory judgments and cases of only threatened
prosecutions where no proceeding has been instituted.
Generally, it is a policy of deference to the state
courts to avoid duplication of proceedings, to reduce any competition for jurisdiction, and to keep
at a minimum any tension between the systems by
not interfering with a state's good faith administration of their criminal laws. The abstention doctrine is applied narrowly when the constitutionality
of state statutes are challenged and is separate
from the questions of case or controversy, standing, and ripeness which must be answered for
every case. See O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488
(1974); Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77 (1971).
The argument is that the state courts are committed to upholding the federal constitution and
should be trusted to carry out this responsibility.
See generally Note, The Federal Anti-Injunction
Statute and Declaratory Judgments in Constitutional Litigation, 83 HARv. L. Rlv. 1870 (1970).
The increased federal court involvement with challenges to state statutes has stemmed from the
Congressional intent to protect civil rights as evidenced by the passage of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1871).
The Court expressed this well in Zwickler v.
Koota:
In thus expanding federal judicial power,
Congress imposed the duty upon all levels of
the federal judiciary to give due respect to a
suitor's choice of federal forum for the hear-
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statutes" has been the major issue for federal
petitioners seeking to obtain equitable relief
from the enforcement of such laws.
Younger v. Harris made clear that a federal
petitioner with a pending state prosecution had
to show bad faith enforcement by state officials,
or, in absence of bad faith, demonstrate that extraordinary circumstances were present estab12
lishing the necessary irreparable injury. justice Black writing for the majority in
Younger emphasized that the usual requirement of irreparable injury was not sufficient
for injunctive relief when the policy of comity
was considered. The Court decided, referring
to Fenner v. Boykin," that the irreparable injury must be "both great and immediate" before interference with state criminal proceedings is appropriate. 14 According to Younger, a
pending prosecution under a statute unconstitutional on its face was not sufficient
for injunctive relief because the constitutional
question could be raised at the state level.
Also, the injury was not considered irreparable
because it was no more than any other crimi15
nal defendant must incur.
ing and decision of his federal constitutional
claims. Plainly, escape from that duty is not
permissable merely because state courts also
have the solemn responsibility, equally with
federal courts 'to guard, enforce, and protect
every right granted or secured by the constitution of the U.S. ..
3 289 U.S. at 248.
Justice Black, with a different perspective in
Younger, defined comity as
a proper respect for state functions, a recognition of the fact that the entire country is
made up of a Union of separate state governments, and a continuance of the belief that the
National Government will fare best if the
States and their institutions are left free to
perform their separate functions in their separate ways.
40111 U.S. at 44.
See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281 & 2284.
12 401 U.S. at 53. As an example of an extraordinary circumstance the Court quoted from Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387 (1941) :
It is of course conceivable that a statute
might be flagrantly and patently violative of
express constitutional prohibitions in every
clause, sentence, and paragraph, and in whatever manner and against whomever an effort
might be made to apply it.
313 U.S. at 402.
13 271 U.S. 240 (1926).

14 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 46 (1971).
15 Id. at 49. Justice Black wrote,
we hold that the Dombrowski decision should
not be regarded as having upset the settled
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Samuels v. Mackell,1 6 decided with Younger,
equated the effect of a declaratory judgment
with that of an injunction when a state court
case was pending. Therefore, the principles of
equity and comity required the same standards
of bad faith enforcement on the part of state
officials and irreparable injury "both great and
immediate" before the district court would
17
grant declaratory relief.
The language of Younger and Samuels arguably implies that bad faith enforcement
would be required for equitable relief when
there is no pending state prosecution. This interpretation limits Dombrowski' s to the fact
situation presented in which bad faith was
clearly demonstrated.' 9 The federal plaintiff in
Dombrowski alleged two major points. First,
that the threatened prosecutions were brought
in bad faith to discourage civil rights
activities.20 Second, that the statutes being
challenged were overbroad and vague regulations of expression. 21 The Court in Dombrowski indicated that this second allegation
established the threat of irreparable injury
required by the traditional doctrines of
equity. 22 The fact that the statutes were overbroad and vague meant the state courts could
not effectively narrow the language in one sindoctrines that have always confined very narrowly the availability of injunctive relief
against state criminal prosecutions. We do not
think that opinion stands for the proposition
that a federal court can properly enjoin enforcement of a statute solely on the basis of a
showing that the statute 'on its face' abridges
First Amendment rights.
401 U.S. at 53.
The Court, in Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319
U.S. 157 (1943), advanced the theory that the injury in a circumstance such as in Younger is that
which is "incidental to every criminal proceeding
brought lawfully and in good faith" and to withdraw the "determination of guilt from the state
courts" would not afford the petitioners "any protection which they could not secure by prompt
trial and appeal pursued to this Court." 319 U.S.
at 164.
16 401 U.S. 66 (1971).
17 Id. at 73.
Is The Court in Dombrowski avoided confrontation with the anti-injunction statute, 28 U.S.C. §
2283, by concluding that the statute did not "preclude injunctions against the institution of state
court proceedings, but only bars stays of suits already instituted." 380 U.S. at 484 n. 2.
29
2 0 380 U.S. at 485-88.
Id. at 490.
2
1 Id.

22

Id. at 491.

gle criminal prosecution. The Court concluded
that in the area of freedom of expression an
individual should not be subjected to the "uncertainties and vagaries" of criminal prosecution and that prior to a limiting construction
individuals should not be prosecuted. The
theory here was that the "chilling effect" on
the petitioner's activity23 compelled equitable
relief to the same extent as bad faith enforcement. Justice Black, however, suggested that
Dombrowski could have been decided on bad
faith harassment alone, thereby accepting the
overbreadth language in Dombrowski as
24
dicta.

Dombrowski and Younger 25 left several
questions unanswered as to the propriety of
federal intervention in different fact situations.
Among these questions was whether the showing of bad faith was essential to the decision
in Dombrowski, or could overbreadth on its
face be alternatively the sole basis for this decision? Could an allegation of unconstitu23 The Court said:
For example, we have consistently allowed attacks on overly broad statutes with no requirement that the person making the attack
demonstrate that his own conduct could not be
regulated by a statute drawn with the requi-

site narrow specificity.

. .

. If the rule were

otherwise, the contours of regulation would
have to be hammered out case by case-and
tested only by those hardy enough to risk
criminal prosecution to determine the proper
scope of regulation ....

we have not thought

that the improbability of successful prosecution
makes the case different. The chilling effect
upon the exercise of First Amendment rights
may derive from the fact of the prosecution,
unaffected by the prospects of its success or
failure.
380 U.S. at 486-487.
See Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. at 252; Ex
parte Young, 209 U.S. at 147.
24 The Court in Younger said:
The District Court, however, thought that the
Dombrowski decision substantially broadened
the availability of injunctions against state
criminal prosecutions and that under that decision the federal courts may give equitable relief, without regard to any showing of bad
faith, or harrassment, whenever a state statute
is found 'on its face' to be vague or overly
broad, in violation of the First Amendment.
.. . But as we have already seen such statements were unnecessary to the decision of that
case, because the Court found that the plaintiffs had alleged a basis for equitable relief
under long established standards.
401 U.S. at 50.
25 See note 1 .spra.
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tionality as applied be sufficient to outweigh
the abstention policy in situations where the
petitioner has no pending state prosecution? In
addition, were the same equitable requirements
for the granting of injunctive relief necessary
for declaratory relief when the federal plaintiff
had no pending prosecution in the state? Finally, assuming again that the federal plaintiff
had no pending state prosecution and that equitable relief was appropriate, was a declaratory judgment preferable to an injunction because it was considered a less coercive
remedy ? 26
27
Subsequent to Younger a number of cases
discussed some of these questions. In 1972 a
federal petitioner, in Lake CarriersAssociation
v. MacMuilan,28 challenged a Michigan law
carrying a criminal penalty interpreted by the
state attorney general as prohibiting the discharge of sewage, whether treated or untreated, in Michigan waters and as requiring
vessels with maritime toilets to have adequate
storage devices. The plaintiff alleged that this
was beyond the police power and unconstitutionally vague. Justice Brennan, in his majority opinion, stated that the policy of comity behind the Younger and Samuels decisions had
"little force in the absence of a pending state
prosecutions." 29 He indicated that the exercise
of court jurisdiction was appropriate if the
standards for declaratory or injunctive relief
were satisfied.30 This conclusion, however, may
be considered as dicta since the Court held
that abstention was appropriate on other
1
3

grounds.
Roe v. Wade

32

and Doe v. Bolton33 both

granted declaratory relief to federal petitioners with no pending state prosecutions involved.
Little discussion was offered on the abstention
question. Arguably, the fact situation in Roe
evidenced the possibility of grave and tangible
26
See Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452
(1974); Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82 (1972)
(Brennan, J., separate opinion).
27 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) ; Doe v.
Bolten, 410 U.S. 179 (1973) ; Lake Carriers Association v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498 (1972).
28 Lake Carriers Association v. MacMullan, 406
U.S. 498 (1972).
29 Id. at 509.
30

31

Id.

Id. at 511-512.
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
33 Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
32
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injury which could be placed in Justice Black's
"extraordinary circumstance" category.36
In
Doe, however, the Court granted declaratory
relief in a special circumstance without even
an allegation of threatened prosecution. The
federal petitioners were physicians who had
not been prosecuted nor threatened with prosecution under the anti-abortion statutes in
question. The unique aspect of the statute,
however, was that physicians were the only individuals against whom the statute applied.
The threat of prosecution emerging from this
circumstance was the reason for granting
relief.35 These post-Younger cases did not provide any definitive answers to the questions on
district court abstention raised by Dombrowski
and the Younger cases. In Steffel v. Thompson, the Supreme Court again reviewed several
of these questions.
The major issue decided by a unanimous
Court in Steffel, with Justice Brennan writing
the majority opinion, was "whether declaratory
relief is precluded when a state prosecution has
been threatened, but is not pending and a
showing of bad faith enforcement or other special circumstances has not been made." 36 Petitioner invoked the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, and requested a declaratory judgment
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201-2202.37 Peti34 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 53 (1971).
See Note, Federal Relief Against Threatened
State Prosecutions: Tie Implications of Younger,
Lake Carriers and Roe, 48 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 965
(1973).
35 The Court said:
The physician is the one against whom these
criminal statutes directly operate in the event
he procures an abortion that does not meet the
statutory exceptions and conditions. The physician-appellants, therefore, assert a sufficiently
direct threat of personal detriment. They
should not be required to await and undergo a
criminal prosecution as the sole means of
seeking relief.
410 U.S. at 188.
36 415 U.S. at 454.
37 See note 6 supra for 42
U.S.C. § 1983.
28 U.S.C. § 2201 provides:
In a case of actual controversy within its
jurisdiction, except with respect to Federal
taxes any court of the United States, upon the
filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare
the rights and other legal relations of any
interested party seeking such declaration,
whether or not further relief is or could be
sought. Any such declaration shall have the
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tioner had requested injunctive relief at the
district court level but only appealed from the
8a
denial of a declaratory judgment.
On October 8, 1970, the petitioner with others had been distributing leaflets protesting the
United States involvement in the Viet Nam
War on an exterior sidewalk of a Georgia
shopping center. Employees of this shopping
center requested them to leave. After refusing,
the police were called in and threatened to arrest the group leafleting. Petitioner left only to
return two days later to distribute leaflets
again. After another police warning the petitioner left while a fellow protester was arrested on a charge of criminal trespass in violation of 26-1503. 39
The district court denied all relief finding no
bad faith and taking the broad language of
Younger as requiring a showing of bad faith
40
even when no state prosecution was pending.
force and effect of a final judgment or decree
and shall be reviewable as such.
28 U.S.C. § 2202 provides:
Further necessary or proper relief based on
a declaratory judgment or decree may be
granted, after reasonable notice and hearing,
against any adverse party whose rights have
been determined by such judgment.
38 Becker v. Thompson, 459 F.2d 919 (5th Cir.
1972).
09 GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1503 (1972). The stat-

ute provides:
(a) A person commits criminal trespass
when he intentionally damages any property of
another without his consent and the damage
thereto is $100 or less, or knowingly and maliciously interferes with the possession or use
of the property of another person without his
consent.
(b) A person commits criminal trespass
when he knowingly and without authority:
(1) Enters upon the land or premises of
another person, or into any part of any vehicle, railroad car, aircraft, or watercraft of another person, for an unlawful purpose; or
(2) Enters upon the land or premises of
another person, or into any part of any vehicle, railroad car, aircraft, or watercraft of another person, after receiving, prior to such
entry, notice from the owner or rightful occupant that such entry is forbidden; or
(3) Remains upon the land or premises of
another person, or within the vehicle, railroad
car, aircraft, or watercraft of another person,
after receiving notice from the owner or
rightful occupant to depart.
(c) A person convicted of criminal trespass
shall be punished as for a misdemeanor.
40 Becker v. Thompson, 334 F. Supp. 1386
.(N.D. Georgia 1971).

On the denial of declaratory relief, the Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recognized
that Younger was explicitly limited to pending
state prosecutions, but reasoned that the language required bad faith to establish irreparable injury in cases with no pending state prosecution. The court then cited Samuels to
support the conclusion that declaratory relief
required the same degree of injury as injunctive relief.4
The Supreme Court in reversing the circuit
court's decision held:
that regardless of whether injunctive relief
may be appropriate, federal declaratory relief
is not precluded when no state prosecution is
pending and a federal plaintiff demonstrates a.
genuine threat of enforcement of a disputed
2
criminal statute on its face or as applied.4
Initially, the Court considered whether there
was an actual controversy as required by Article III of the Constitution and the express
terms of the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28
U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202. Justice Brennan asserted
that the two threats of prosecution to the petitioner plus the prosecution of a companion established a genuine threat of prosecution. As
in previous cases,4 the Court emphasized that
it was not necessary for petitioner to actually
risk prosecution to challenge the validity of a
state statute imparing his or her constitutionally protected rights. Nevertheless, the Court
was uncertain whether there was ripe controversy since changes in the Viet Nam War policy may have lessened the petitioner's desire to
leaflet. This issue was remanded to the district
44
court for further consideration.
The Court rejected the court of appeals rationale for deciding that a declaratory judgment was not appropriate. Justice Brennan
said that the policy of comity and federalism
did not apply to a federal petitioner with no
pending state prosecution and then noted
Younger and Samuel's explicit limitation to
41 Becker v. Thompson, 459 F.2d 919 (5th Cir.
1972).
42 415 U.S. at 475.
43 See Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241 (1967) ;
Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965);
Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 147 (1908).
44 415 U.S. at 460.
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cases with pending prosecutions. 45 The Court
said:
When no state criminal proceeding is pending
at the time the federal complaint is filed, federal intervention does not result in duplicative
legal proceedings or disruption of the state
criminal system; nor can federal intervention
in that circumstance be interpreted as reflecting negatively upon the state court's ability to
enforce constitutional principles.4 6
justice Brennan stated that if no remedy
was offered in this situation, the petitioner
must either face arrest or refrain from exercising his first amendment freedom of
expression.
45 Id.

47

at 461-462. The Court said:
When no state proceeding is pending and
thus considerations of equity, comity, and federalism have little vitality, the propriety of
granting federal declaratory relief may properly be considered independently of a request
for injunctive relief.
In Younger the Court said:
We express no views about the circumstances
under which federal courts may act when
there is no prosecution pending in the state
courts at the time the federal proceeding is
begun.
401 U.S. at 41.
In Samuels the Court said:
We, of course, express no views on the propriety of declaratory relief when no state proceeding is pending at the time the federal suit
is begun.
401 U.S. at 73-74.
If comity was not at issue at all, however, this
case would appear to depend only upon the meeting of the equitable standards for declaratory relief. As is implied by Brennan's opinion there must
be some intrusion into state affairs even in nonpending situations because he discusses at length
the less coercive nature of a declaratory judgment
as opposed to injunctive relief. See text p. 489
Infra. See also Justice Brennan's separate opinion
in Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82 (1971).
46 415 U.S. at 462.
47 The opinion stated:
In addition, while a pending state prosecution
provides the federal plaintiff with a concrete
opportunity to vindicate his constitutional
rights, a refusal on the part of the federal
courts to intervene when no state proceeding
is pending may place the hapless plaintiff between the Scylla of intentionally flouting state
law and the Charybdis of forgoing what he
believes to be constitutionally protected activity in order to avoid becoming enmeshed in a
criminal proceeding.
415 U.S. at 462.
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The Court indicated that two significant factors were involved in considering the appropriateness of declaratory relief. One was its express authorization by Congress 48 and the
other that it afforded a "less harsh and abrasive remedy than the injunction . . . . ,49 Justice Brennan argued that the states were dissatisfied with injunctive relief because it totally
restricted them from future review50 and that
plaintiffs were reluctant to pursue injunctive
relief because of the difficulties incurred in
meeting the traditional equity requirement of
irreparable injury. He emphasized that the
Federal Declaratory judgment Act1 was enacted to serve as an alternative to injunctive
relief and therefore involved different judicial
52
considerations before relief was granted.
48 415 U.S. at 463. See Perez v. Ledesma, 401
U.S. 82, 104 (1971) (separate opinion).
49 415 U.S. at 463.
50 If a statute is enjoined from prosecution the
state prosecutor can not bring any further action
pursuant to that law. If he does, contempt charges
can be brought against him. This type of relief in
effect renders the law void. 415 U.S. at 465-470.
justice Brennan in his separate opinion in Perez
wrote:
An injunction barring enforcement of a criminal statute paralyzes the State's enforcement
machinery: the statute is rendered a nullity. A
declaratory judgment, on the other hand, is
merely a declaration of legal status and
rights; it neither mandates nor prohibits state
action.
401 U.S. at 82.
The Senate report stated:
The declaratory judgment differs in no essential respect from any other judgment except
that it is not followed by a decree for damages, injunction, specific performance, or other
immediately coercive decree. It declares conclusively and finally the rights of parties in
litigations over a contested issue, a form of
relief which often suffices to settle controversies and fully administer justice....
S. REP. No. 1005, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 2-3,
(1934).
5128 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202 (1948). See note 37
supra.
52415 U.S. at 469. See Zwickler v. Koota, 389
U.S. 241 (1967). The Court in Zwickler said:
For a request for a declaratory judgment that
a state statute is overbroad on its face must
be considered independently of any request for
injunctive relief against the enforcement of
that statute. We hold that a federal district
court has the duty to decide the appropriateness and the merits of the declaratory request
irrespective of its conclusion as to the propriety of the issuance of the injunction.
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One consideration was that the declaratory
judgment was less intrusive upon the state administration of criminal laws. If a statute was
enjoined from enforcement and a prosecutor
then brought an action he would be subject to
contempt proceedings and the action would
cease as res judicata. State officials, however,
could still bring an action subsequent to a declaratory judgment and no contempt proceed53
ings would be possible. Assuming the statute
in question was not unconstitutional "in toto,"
state action was not totally precluded by a declaratory judgment. The Court suggested that
the statute could be declared only partially unconstitutional thus allowing for a narrower
54
construction by the state courts.
389 U.S. at 254.
53 415 U.S. at 469-471. The Court said:
If a declaration of partial unconstitutionality
is affirmed by this Court, the implication is
that this Court will overturn particular applications of the statute, but that if the statute is
narrowly construed by the state courts it will
not be incapable of constitutional applications.
Accordingly, the declaration does not necessarily bar prosecutions under the statute, as a
broad injunction would.
415 U.S. at 470.
Though it (declaratory relief) may be persuasive, it is not ultimately coercive; noncompliance with it may be inappropriate, but is not
contempt.
415 U.S. at 471.
54 If a statute

is declared unconstitutional in

part this represents the opinion of the Court as to
the "legal status and rights" of the petitioner. If a
state prosecutor feels in good faith that the court
was incorrect or that the statute may be given a
more limited view, the possibility of bringing action still remains. The statute could be narrowed
through a prosecution without having to go
through a separate civil proceeding to obtain a
modification of the ruling. "The persuasive force
of the court's opinion may lead state prosecutors,
courts, and legislators to reconsider their respective responsibilities toward the statute. Enforcement policies or judicial construction may be
changed.. .

."

Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 125

(1971) (separate opinion).
But see Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 70
(1971) The Court said:
Although the declaratory judgment sought by
plaintiffs was a statutory remedy rather than
a traditional form of equitable relief, the
Court made clear that a suit for declaratory
judgment was nevertheless 'essentially an equitable cause of action,' and was 'analogous
to the equity jurisdiction in suits quia timet or
for a decree quieting title.' . . . the legislative
history of the Federal Declaratory Judgement
Act of 1934 . . . showed that Congress had

In the absence of irreparable injury 5 a federal petitioner could obtain judicial determination of his rights through a declaratory judg58
Even if
ment rather than face prosecution.
the judgment was not handed down by the Supreme Court it still would act as a strong force
if the state decided to prosecute, thereby serving the petitioner's needs by lessening any
chilling effect. Justice Brennan suggested that
there may be some res judicata effect also, but
57
did not expand upon this point.
Another consideration was that irreparable
injury and exhaustion of state remedies were
not required for declaratory relief. Otherwise,
the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act would
58
have been "pro tanto" repealed. The traditional equitable standards would only apply to,
declaratory relief when a prosecution was.
explicitly contemplated that the courts would
decide to grant or withhold declaratory relief
on the basis of traditional equitable principles.
55 The factor of a possible prosecution alone
was not considered to be enough to establish irreparable injury thus precluding relief for many petitioners. See note 15 supra.
The Senate report on the Declaratory Judgment
Act reads:
The procedure has been especially useful in
avoiding the necessity, now so often present,
of having to act at one's peril or to act on
one's own interpretation of his rights, or
abandon one's rights because of fear of incurring damages. So now it is often necessary, in
absence of the declaratory judgment procedure, to violate a statute in order to obtain a
judicial determination of its meaning or validity.
S. Rm. No. 1005, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 2-3, 6
(1934).
56 The Court said,
engrafting upon the Declaratory Judgment
Act a requirement that all of the traditional
equitable prerequisites to the issurance of an
injunction be satisfied before the issuance of a
declaratory judgment is considered would defy
Congress' intent to make declaratory relief
available in cases where an injunction would
be inappropriate.
415 U.S. at 471.
57 415 U.S. at 470-471. See Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179
(1973). In both Doe and Roe the Court did not
consider whether injunctive relief was appropriate
because they assumed the respective states' authorities would give "full credence" to the declaratory
relief.
65 Id. at 471. See Aetna Life Insurance Co. v.
Haworth, 300 U.S. 227 (1937); Wup v. Corcoran, 454 F.2d 826,832 (1972).
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pending and comity was the important policy
requiring abstention. 59
Justice Brennan rejected the argument that
a declaratory judgment could only be granted
when statutes were unconstitutional on their
face. He indicated that abstention may be more
appropriate when the statute is attacked as applied rather than on its face. He recognized,
however, that fact situations such as in Stefel
may compel declaratory relief when the challenge is to the application. This intimates that
a well established threat of prosecution may
have to be shown before declaratory relief will
be granted when the statute is challenged only
as applied. 60 The Court concluded that the petitioner here could appropriately be granted
declaratory relief pending the determination of
the ripeness issue by the district court on remand.
Steffel left a number of questions unanswered. There was no indication whether injunctive relief was appropriate when a federal
petitioner had no pending state prosecution
and no showing of bad faith was made. In
other words, was injunctive relief possible
when a federal petitioner was threatened by a
good faith prosecution with statutes either
overbroad and vague on their face as the language in Dombrowski implied, 61 or unconstitutional as applied which the holding of Steffel
may infer? The issue of abstention is entirely
5 Id. at 472. See Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S.
66 (1971) ; Great Lakes Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S.
293 (1943).
60 Justice Brennan wrote, "The solitary individual who suffers a deprivation of his constitutional
rights is no less deserving of redress than one
who suffers together with others." 415 U.S. at
474-475.
61 380 U.S. at 486-487. See note 23 supra. This
kind of implication involves rejecting justice
Black's limitation of Dombrowski to bad faith and
accepting the overbreadth allegations in Doinbrowski as reason alone for relief. See note 24 supra.
The Court in Zwickler v. Koota wrote:
These principles have particular significance
when, as in this case, the attack upon the statute on its face is for repugnancy to the First
Amendment. In such case to force the plaintiff
who has commenced a federal action to suffer
the delay of state court proceedings might itself effect the impermissible chilling of the
very constitutional right he seeks to protect.
389 U.S. at 252.
See Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 118 (1971)
(separate opinion).
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separate from the question of whether the equitable standards for relief have been met. 62
Therefore, if the policy of comity and federalism are not at issue, the only question to be addressed is whether the standards for injunctive
relief or the standards for declaratory relief
have been satisfied, depending upon which remedy is requested. This would mean that the requirements of bad faith and irreparable harm
are compelled for equitable relief only when a
state prosecution is pending. This is supported
by the language in Steffel which indicated that
the principles of federalism and comity were
not at issue when there was no state prosecution pending. 63 Therefore, it may follow that
the only requirement for injunctive relief in
cases without pending state prosecution would
be the traditional equitable standards.6 '
In contrast, one could argue that the question of abstention was still at issue even when
no state prosecution is pending because any
form of equitable relief which passes judgment
on a state statute is still a significant intrusion
into state affairs.6 5 Justice Brennan's extensive
discussion of declaratory relief as a "mild" remedy in Steffel would lend support to an argument that declaratory relief is preferable to injunctive relief in a situation where no
prosecution is pending. As previously discussed, one of the "mild" aspects of declaratory
relief was that state officials were not pre62 See note 52 supra.
63 415 U.S. 461-462.

64 This line of reasoning assumes that the Declaratory Judgment Act was enacted primarily to
prevent abuse of injunctive relief rather than to
provide a less intrusive remedy for situations when
state laws are in question. In other words, if the
declaratory judgment was to provide protection
when irreparable harm may not be established an
injunction would still be appropriate when this
kind of injury was shown. The Senate report
stated :
The fact is that the declaratory judgment has
often proved so necessary that it has been employed under other names for years, and that
in many cases the injunction procedure is
abused in order to render what is in effect a
declaratory judgment.
S. REP. No. 1005, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 2-3, 6
(1934).
65 Justice Brennan wrote in his separate opinion
in Perez, "There is, of course, some intrusion into
a state's administration of its criminal laws whenever a federal court renders a declaratory judgment upon the constitutionality of a state criminal
enactment." 401 U.S. at 104.
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cluded from bringing future action. It is not
clear, however, whether the state is precluded
from future action in the case of injunctive relief, thus throwing some doubt on any conclusion that declaratory relief is the preferable
remedy. In Dombrowski, Justice Brennan indicated that after an injunction had been granted
the state could obtain, in a non-criminal proceeding, a narrower construction of the enjoined statute which would permit future
prosecution." He added that after a limiting
construction was obtained in order to modify
an enjoined statute, it could be used to prosecute individuals for conduct occurring prior to
67
the construction.
Considering whether this decision opened a
new and less restrictive path to federal court
adjudication, Justice Stewart, with the Chief Justice concurring, stated that individuals who
even "genuinely feel chilled" by a statute's existence would not necessarily obtain equitable
relief. A genuine controversy and an objective
threat of criminal prosecution was required. In
Steffet this objective threat was shown by the
two threats of prosecution towards the petitioner and the arrest of his companion for engaging in the same activity the petitioner had
engaged in. 68
Steffet did not decide any question of the
subsequent effect of a declaratory judgment
upon prosecutions brought pursuant to statutes
declared unconstitutional. However, Justices
White and Rehnquist debated the issue in their
respective concurring opinions. Justice White
concluded that a declaratory judgment should
be res judicata in a prosecution of the federal
plaintiff subsequent to his receiving declaratory
relief in the federal courts. Justice White
argued that a declaratory judgment should
"have the force and effect of a final judgment
or decree" 69 so as not to become an advisory
opinion. He indicated that further state action
70
could then be enjoined.
Although not mentioned in Justice White's
opinion, the explicit exception in the antiinjunction statute allowing injunctive relief to
"protect or effectuate its judgment" supports
66 380 U.S. at 491.
67 Id. at 491

& n.7.

68 415 U.S. at 476 (Stewart, J., concurring).
69 Id. at 477-478.

70 This would be pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2202.
See note 37 mupra.

his position. 71 Arguably, this exception is not
fully subject to the policy of comity because it
is a specific indication of the intent of Congress to enforce judgments of the judicial
branch. This reasoning may also follow when
the case is brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because that statute has been held to be an explicit exception to 28 U.S.C. § 2283.72
Justice Rehnquist rejected the theory that a
declaratory judgment was res judicata in subsequent state proceedings or that an injunction
could be granted to support such declaration.
He also rejected the idea that prosecution of a
statute declared unconstitutional could be considered per se bad faith in order to meet the
Younger test for injunctive relief.73 He argued
that this result disregarded Justice Brennan's
conclusion that the declaratory judgment was a
milder remedy which was less intrusive upon
the state judicial process. Justice Rehnquist
argued that if a declaratory judgment was res
judicata for a subsequent prosecution pursuant
to the already declared unconstitutional statute,
the principle of Samuels would be totally circumvented and the policy of comity and federalism would be avoided merely by first getting
declaratory relief.7 4 The reason for not interfering with state pending prosecution was not
based on "the closeness of the constitutional
issue nor on the confidence which the federal
court possesses in the correctness of its conclusions on the constitutional point" but on the
principle of creating a better relationship with
the state court system, said Justice
75
Rehnquist.
Steffel added significantly to the clarification
of federal abstention by holding that where
there was no pending state prosecution and a
genuine threat of prosecution was shown pursuant to a statute unconstitutional on its face
or as applied, federal abstention was not com7128 U.S.C. § 2282 (1948). See note 10 supra.
Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 237-238
(1972).
72

73 401
74

U.S. at 52-54.
justice Rehnquist wrote:

It would all but totally obscure these important distinctions if a successful application for
declaratory relief came to be regarded, not as
the conclusion of a lawsuit, but as a giant step
towards obtaining an injunction against subsequent criminal prosecution.
415 U.S. at 481 (concurring opinion),
75 Id. at 481-482.
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pelled and granting declaratory relief was appropriate. Future petitioners would be well advised to heed Justice Stewart's warning that a
genuine threat of prosecution should be established, as was clearly shown in Steffel.716 Any
76

415 U.S. at 476.
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fact situation not as clear may jeopardize federal review especially where the challenge is
77
to the statute as applied.
7 Id. at 474, 476, & n21. Justice Stewart, in his
concurring opinion, stated: "Cases where such a
genuine threat can be demonstrated will, I think,
be exceedingly rare."

